We define the creative industries as those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property. This includes advertising, architecture, the art and antiques market, crafts, design, designer fashion, film and video, interactive leisure software, music, the performing arts, publishing, software and computer games, television and radio. (DCMS, 2003) 
The 'we' in this instance is the United Kingdom's Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). While one might take issue with this definition or, better still, subject it and its many counterparts to close and comparative textual scrutiny, it articulates an attribute common to many understandings of creative industries -'intellectual property as a source of wealth' -and enumerates a familiar list of cultural sectors. It is also a definition that reminds me of just how fortunate I am as a tenured academic whose stock in trade is intellectual property, but whose cultural sector (knowledge) is conspicuously absent from the quote. My industry, despite the contradictions of its real world engagement with quixotic trends in financial and student markets, remains committed to the trappings of a pre-capitalist cultural order and the securities of lifelong employment. And, although I do my part by 'giving' papers and interviews rather than charging by the quarter hour, I am quite aware that I inhabit a rare and privileged zone.
That said, I physically live with workers whose labors and intellectual property are exploited in the service of creative industries. I live in what a decade ago would have been called an artists' collective, with people engaged in the production of intellectual property (or what would then have been called culture) and whose careers are by and large accounted for in the opening definition. Conversations in the mailroom or garden constantly bring home the distance between my tenured security and the largely precarious economic existence of these self-employed artists, contract software designers, freelance architects and musicians and actors in search of the next gig. This is not to say that my neighbors are unsuccessful or poor (many are quite the opposite); rather, that they stand alone, detached from larger social infrastructure or the organized protection of their peers, dependent on the ephemeral market values of their creativity as they broker their intellectual property into the resources necessary for material existence. Are their circumstances really so different from those of artists a decade or even a century ago? The language of industry, wealth and job creation has certainly changed the stakes from the romantic pursuit of truth and beauty to the somewhat harsher realities of the marketplace, but it is the relation of the individual to the (institutional) holder of intellectual rights that seems to make a difference.
Conversations with my creative worker neighbors in the US and their counterparts in my other home, the Netherlands, have certainly sharpened my understanding of the implications and contradictions of neoliberal visions of cultural production. However, they have also alerted me to developments that may radically redefine the nature of the industries in which they work. These developments are associated with the World Wide Web, dynamic IP addresses, and so on and have been enabled by technologies such as Mosaic and the Pentium chip -technologies that are less than a decade old and that have been used to construct peer-to-peer (P2P) communities (for example, KaZaA) and open source software exchange (for example, Linux). Reinforced by the rapid spread of broadband connections (from 3 million in 1999 to over 63 million in early 2003), 1 these developments pose significant challenges to some existing industries in the creative sector and, indeed, might even be seen as offering alternate organizational logics. Relatively new, simultaneously hyped and demonized in the press and concentrated in generationally-specific cohorts of users, they have been met with ambivalence, at least by those creative workers with whom I've spoken. On the one hand, they seem to subvert the logics of trickle-down profit, threatening the income upon which my neighbors rely for their living; on the other hand, they hold the promise of radical reformulation, of an unknown but hopefully better future without the exploitive helping hand of large-scale corporate creative industries. But these new cultural practices have deeper and more interesting implications, implications that must be seen against the backdrop of two very different conceptions of creative industries: one dominant in the US and the other in much of the developed (and a good portion of the developing) world.
The European example: the cultural public sphere
The British Council, the UK's cultural interface with the world, reiterated the DCMS's enumeration of relevant creative industries, noting, in addition, that:
In 2000, they contributed more than 112 billion pounds to the UK economy and are estimated to be growing at about twice the rate of the UK economy as a whole. In addition to support received through the various arts councils in the UK, the regional arts boards, arts organisations and individuals have benefited enormously from National Lottery funds. (British Council, 2003) Issues of revenue production aside, if we look more broadly at Europe, support for creative industries goes far beyond regional arts councils and national lotteries. Culture ministries have significant resources at their disposal and play a defining role in maintaining the traditional arts, stimulating media production and underwriting everything from architectural projects, to translation initiatives, to software development. They are frequently joined in this effort by finance and development ministries, whose interests are job production and the bottom line. The EU, in turn, has developed initiatives of its own to bolster support for collaborative creative enterprises while serving the cause of European unification. The result is a rich panoply of resources designed to stimulate (and steer) Europe's creative industries. This is not to deny the regulatory dimension of cultural policy (for, as the GATT negotiations of a decade ago demonstrated, they are pronounced), but rather to say that most European nations make good use of the carrot as well as the stick. One can make equivalent claims about non-European nations, from Australia and Singapore to Brazil and Cuba.
Several motives seem intertwined in these deeply embedded traditions of cultural subsidy. The maintenance (or, in the case of the EU, creation) of particular identities (whether ethnic, regional, national or transnational) seems the most obvious. But subsidies to cinemas, opera houses and museums, all steered by state arts commissions, arts prizes, academies, and so on, not only help to bolster identity construction in general, but implicitly speak to the tastes and perceived needs of particular social formations. So, for example, while the arguments for cinema subsidy may have to do with defending national culture in the face of Hollywood imports, museum subsidies may be directed towards the purchase of yet another Picasso or Rembrandt, regardless of the national setting. Certain cultural artifacts, particularly those associated with elite tastes, cross national borders more easily than others, particularly those construed as popular. While correlations of taste, class and the acceptance or restriction of transnational cultural flows offer important insights into the complexities of cultural citizenship, 2 they also line up with patterns of creative production. The traditionally artisan, whether art, literature or opera, both the repository and continuation of pre-20th-century culture, seems to pose little threat as it passes from nation to nation. By contrast, the transnational circulation of the mass-produced, whether film, television or recorded music, stands as evidence of cultural imperialism and possibly even degeneration. The difference in modes of production, like the assumed difference in audiences, is revealing. Concerns over the more industrial of the two modes of production suggest that more than identity is at stake: economic protectionism is also a very real issue.
The state's intervention in creative production in the form of subsidies, governmental infrastructure, and so on is obviously part of a larger conception of the nation in which cultural participation is a manifestation of citizenship. The French, particularly during the 1993 GATT talks, offered an articulate defense of this longstanding position (Uricchio, 1996) . From this perspective, creative industries, while healthy for the economy and beneficial to the narrower interests of certain taste formations, fundamentally provide a cultural public sphere within which citizenship can be enacted. Identity politics of the fullest sort, cultural participation of this kind is a deep tradition that, in many national contexts, is beginning to address the realities of multicultural society. Halting and at best awkward, the recalibration of the cultural public sphere to accommodate these newly perceived identities nevertheless remains firmly inscribed within the domain of cultural citizenship. The neoliberal rebranding of cultural production as creative industry has not lost sight of this fundamental charge; rather, it has called in the finance ministry to return a profit on the mission. Capitalization and investment with the hope of returns, the logics of efficiency and the metaphors of industrial production have penetrated this citizenly sphere. Times are changing and it is with increasing difficulty that many European nations endeavor to hold fast to a definition of culture as culture rather than as commodity, culture as something to be nurtured, protected and stimulated by the state in tandem with the citizen rather than by the market in search of a consumer. However, while the situation is in flux, culture remains the responsibility of the state and thus a matter of public policy.
The US model: consumption as civic duty
In the US, as in the rest of the world, (commercial) creative industries are more concentrated than ever, steadily sharpening their understanding of the possibilities of convergent media systems as they grow more successful in winning political support for their curious program of market deregulation and intellectual property re-regulation. In the peculiarly American environment that lacks all but the vestiges of culture as a common good, there has been no serious governmental attempt to stimulate a public culture since the quickly extinguished endeavors of Roosevelt's New Deal. The contrast with Europe, Australia and other parts of the world couldn't be sharper. This is not to say that the national government (or its state and local-level counterparts) has abdicated control. A long history of regulatory pressures on the film industry, broadcasters and even comic book publishers attests to free use of the stick, and market protection and tax incentives might even be construed as evidence of the carrot. But these latter mechanisms are commonly deployed for most industrial endeavors and, although they have a shaping effect, they have almost never been used to stimulate a particular national vision of culture. Art subsidies can, of course, be found on various governmental levels, but the most prominent of these, the National Endowment for the Arts, is reported to have a smaller annual budget than the Marine marching band (Bodah, 2003) .
So where does this leave us? In the US, creativity, like culture, finds itself situated as a commodity, and its dominant logics regard profit maximization. 'Content' industries are basically in the business of identifying markets and serving them, using the well-oiled efficiencies of production, control of distribution and finely tuned conditions of exhibition to address the bottom line. Consistent with this, expansion (globalization) has been the rule, although this by no means equates with universalized taste. Instead, market segmentation has been embraced, complete with the targeting of particular demographic sectors (age, gender, ethnicity and income) as relevant cohorts and an ever more refined understanding and targeting of taste formations. Although this trend tends to be associated with the US, it is neither American nor exclusive to it, as corporations from Sony to Bertelsmann attest and as evidenced by the fact that 78 percent of the US book market is in the hands of two German corporations. This is a world where the consumer is king, where freedom of choice is exercised as a market right and where the last subsidized bastions of 'old' culture are reduced to the status of sign (and a sign of status), conforming to the same logics as designer clothes labels. It is a world where creative industries deploy the same hard-nosed strategies as any other industry, with the added benefit of no long-term contracts, pension plans or labor unions to contend with. And it is the world in which my neighbors compete to market their intellectual property while thinking longingly of their counterparts in other parts of the world where subsidies, cultural policies and visions of (national) cultural participation remain the norm.
Creative activity -and, by implication, the meaning of creative industries -thus inhabits two very different cultural contexts. The project of using culture as a way of constructing and maintaining identity and as a space for the enactment of an expanded notion of citizenship contrasts sharply with the use of culture as commodity and the recasting of citizen into consumer (a turn made all the more explicit since 9/11; consumption has become a civic responsibility). This formulation admittedly caricatures the complexities of national (and other) subjectivities in the interest of clear delineation. But, while the contexts for understanding and thinking through the implications of creative industries are quite different, it is also important to acknowledge the blurring of boundaries that is taking place. The everyday business of representation engaged in by multinational multimedia corporations such as Fox, Time Warner, Bertelsmann and Sony has certainly helped to confuse things. So too have these corporations' lobbying efforts, most evident in the redefinition of intellectual property guidelines and treaties. These developments have been driven by the joint pressures exerted by the multinational media cartel and the US government, the latter armed with an extensive tradition of jurisprudence in an area where most European courts, working from the Napoleonic Code, have strong principles, but little precedent. The resulting changes have been both global and profound and are only now beginning to appear in public debate. Ever growing concentrations of corporate ownership in the creative sector, the steady amassing of intellectual property (consider Corbis and Getty's image acquisition policies) and international copyright and trademark treaties have slowly but surely limited creative workers' horizon of possibility. Particularly from the American perspective, the trend looks bleak. What's a creative worker to do?
Challenging the status quo
In May 2003, the city of Munich announced that Microsoft Windows would no longer be the operating system for its 14,000 computers. Instead, city managers decided to move to an open source software system, Linux, in order to place the functioning of the government in the hands of its citizens rather than shareholders (Economist, 2003) . The move is an increasingly familiar one, even if other rationales have been put forward to account for it. Developing nations such as Mexico, India, Brazil and even G7 nations such as Japan are defecting from the proprietary standards of large commercial software vendors. Within the US, multinationals such as McDonalds, Chevron, Amazon, Pixar, Dreamworks, Salomon Smith Barney, Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse First Boston have all recently moved significant parts of their technology infrastructure across to Linux. While it is too early to consider Microsoft and its counterparts irrelevant, these large-scale, centralized and highly protective creatures seem increasingly like dinosaurs in the midst of a rapid climatic shift. By contrast, their open source rivals are highly adaptive organisms, offering dramatically lower pricing, faster rates of mutation and ease of customization as well as the citizenly and communitarian appeals posited by Munich's city leaders. They also offer an insight into the fast changing world of key creative sectors, where technologically enabled grassroots movements are circumventing long-dominant traditions of governmental and corporate intervention. The creative work goes on, but its organization looks very unlike the institutional forms that we associate with late capitalism.
The open source-Microsoft standoff encapsulates a transformation that can be seen in other institutionalized creative industries. Self-organizing communities join together to provide alternative (usually better and cheaper) creative interventions that exist outside traditional notions of intellectual property (and thus the clutches of large-scale centralized corporations). Sometimes, as in the case of open source software, strategies such as Copyleft assure that the principle of 'openness' is both guaranteed and replicated by its users. And sometimes, as in the case of much music file exchanging, existing intellectual property rights are simply ignored (a point of concern for some cultural workers, but quickly relativized by the generally low royalty percentages awarded them by their corporate bosses). In either case, the centralized institutional power associated with the exploitation and concentration of intellectual property -corporate creative industries -is potentially undercut and marginalized.
Two provisos are in order. First, as mentioned at the outset, these are relatively new developments and, although they are growing exponentially and usage rates are particularly high in parts of Asia and within western youth culture, one can only speculate as to their long-term implications. The example of radio's first decade, with widespread reliance on self-made receivers and two-way transmissions, reminds us of just how difficult it would have been to imagine that, within 20 years, receiver manufacture and one-way broadcasting would become a centralized industry. There are very real reasons to question the utopian vision of a P2P future. Second, although enabled by certain technological developments (widespread computer and telephone ownership, Mosaic, the internet and the Pentium chip), these elements did not cause a change in cultural power relations; these technologies and their applications were themselves socially brokered and addressed competing needs within the marketplace and public sphere. Widespread and affordable digital technologies certainly facilitated grassroots production (audio, video, photographic, the written word) and distribution (bypassing the content cartels associated with each of these media forms), but this is quite a different claim from saying that they caused it.
That said, we need to remember that the introduction of the Pentium chip and upgraded operating systems transformed millions of 'toylike' home and office PCs into a formidable network by the mid-to-late 1990s. Netconnected PCs are currently estimated to be capable of hosting something like an aggregate 10 billion megahertz of processing power and 10,000 terabytes of storage. 3 The scale of this far exceeds anything available to the centralized media industries and, moreover, speaks directly to the elegant logic of network culture. If we take the political to be the organization of power within a society, then self-organizing P2P networks should be taken very seriously.
Redefining the citizen/consumer divide: P2P networks and open source communities
What do music file exchanges like KaZaA and Gnutella, collaborative news networks like Slashdot and Kuro5hin and open source operating systems like Linux have in common? They are all forms of digital culture that are networked in technology, are P2P in organization and are collaborative in principle. Although they may seem to be on the fringes of the digital scene, their impact on existing cultural practices may well turn out to be disproportionate to their apparent position; indeed, their implications for how we define certain practices, including the practice of citizenship, and how we participate in cultural production are potentially transformative. These systems might be seen as part of a larger participatory turn in culture whereby the users generate the content, evident in such diverse activities as fan fiction production, computer gaming and club culture. 4 Although the notion of 'participatory culture' is not without its complexities, even at its simplest level of meaning, the concept signals a blurring of the boundaries between the categories of production and consumption and a subversion of established hierarchies of cultural value and authority.
On the level of cultural practice, these particular manifestations of P2P networking have already managed to challenge the dominant meanings and practices associated with journalism, software development, some forms of artistic production and intellectual property. This challenge stems not so much from a critical discursive posture as from the creation of working alternatives -demonstrations of the advantages of networked collaboration that to some extent 'speak for themselves'. In contrast to the organization of most contemporary cultural industries, these P2P networks thrive in a dehierarchized, decentralized and distributed organizational environment and require collectivity and collaboration as conditions of existence. Whether measured in terms of evolutionary advance or elegance of use of existing infrastructure or simple economic advantage, these systems are unparalleled by mainstream practices, no matter how massive. The music industry has neither computers large enough nor centralized management systems powerful enough to rival KaZaA's or Gnutella's distributed systems, nor can Microsoft's proprietary and centralized operating system develop with the same speed or responsiveness as open source alternatives such as Linux. Combined with these networks' remarkable ability to find willing participants, these challenges to the status quo (and some extraordinarily powerful corporations) are potentially profound. As previously mentioned, they bring with them a particularly interesting set of implications for the larger social processes bound up in the term 'citizenship'. In extreme cases, they are capable of forcing a conflict between the obligations of cultural citizenship and political citizenship.
As music file sharing networks, collaborative news networks and open source software developments all demonstrate, a series of fundamental challenges have been mounted to the status quo and even to more recent assumptions regarding digital culture. The very definitions of cultural practices (music, news, software development and intellectual property) have been put into question by these participatory networks. Furthermore, the institutional practices behind them have to some extent been subverted, at least according to the claims of the Recording Industry Association of America, the Creative Incentive Coalition, the Motion Picture Association of America and the World Intellectual Property Organization, among others. In every case, these challenges have been powered by distributed PCs, bound together by collaborative networks and given life by participatory communities of users/creators. A blurring of sorts has taken place not only between producers and consumers, but with regard to definitions of cultural practices. Within the context of the territorial nation state, the definitions of things like commercial music and intellectual property are clear, however, in the context of the dispersed collaborative communities of Gnutella users, these definitions are far from self-evident.
The question, therefore, particularly at a moment of complex appeals to identity, regards the choice of a framework for cultural citizenship. Those practices that take place in the globally networked online communities thus far mentioned call upon enactments of cultural citizenship that are defined by high levels of participation. But the act of participation also brings with it a good chance of transgression -for the territorial nation state has long been the definer of regulatory power and the enforcer of legal code (Reidenberg, 1999: 85) -and a strong measure of challenge to the status quo. As argued at the outset, in the US context, participation is defined in terms of consumption, and the rule set seems to reflect the interests of concentrated media industries. In much of the rest of the world, cultural enactments of citizenship remain vital to the nation and are accordingly subsidized and shaped by it. Several issues emerge from these new cultural forms. How will creativity and culture be defined? Will they (from a European perspective) remain the domain of the state as part of a project of maintaining identity? Will they (from a US perspective) serve the needs of the marketplace? Or will they (from a networked P2P perspective) emerge from grassroots practices and serve the interests of a deterritorialized community of users? What status will the fruits of creative work enjoy? Will they be seen as commodities, opportunities for the creative service sector to contribute its share to the gross national product? Will they be seen as continued evidence of cultural patrimony and the character of the state? Or will they emerge as vital forces in human communities defined on the basis of shared interest and common participation? These questions both address and, in a fundamental way, challenge the taken-for-grantedness of the existing cultural order.
Blurry-eyed idealism?
The coupling of the words 'creative' and 'industries' is highly loaded, bringing with it a range of references harkening -depending upon one's orientation -back to the glory days of Locke's and Marx's notions of political economy, Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of the readymade and Baudrillard's postmodern invocation of the economy of signs. Those seeking to drill down into the intellectual contexts for the pairing have selectively invoked these thinkers and others, leading to a complex palimpsest of reference and definition (see, for example, du Gay and Pryke, 2002) . Moreover, as I have suggested, the term creative industries has been deployed quite differently throughout the planet, a complicating factor considering the global reach of many cultural forms. The main fault lines have traditionally appeared between the US, where the marketplace and consumer rule, and much of the rest of the world, where notions of the cultural public sphere and citizenship remain relevant (if under siege). However, if we can extrapolate from less than a decade's worth of experience with P2P networks and open source software communities, these two constructions may find themselves pressured from an unexpected and elusive alternative. Whatever the corporate and state concerns over these global networks, the realignment of the citizen/consumer divide, brought about by the blurring of producer/consumer relations and the requirements of citizenship in digitally enabled communities, holds the possibility for very real transformation.
The situation is evolving very quickly and, much as I would like to end on a utopian note, embracing the immanence of the communist eschaton, several counter-trends bear mentioning. Social panics (child pornography, terrorism) are being deployed in ways that may transform and constrain internet culture; corporations are increasingly aware of the power of participatory culture and are incorporating elements of P2P culture in their marketing (see: http://www.yaya.com; http://www.cokemusic.com); and the technological possibilities of the next generation web are being defined by the fears of 20th-century media conglomerates as they back into the future. This leaves unaddressed the very real need for creative workers to be able to thrive as a result of their activity, for it is not at all clear how communities and networks will provide for their members. One indication of a solution can be found online in Scott McCloud's important argument for a new creative economy, I Can't Stop Thinking! (McCloud, 2000-01) . The next few years will be critical for the future of new models of creative activity and for the redefinition of the cultural citizen/consumer relationship. Revenue models, the future of intellectual property and the blurring of lines between producers and consumers all bring with them very real challenges. But they also awaken the hope that any easy projections we can now make about a corporate or state future for creative culture may be overthrown by something a little more bottom-up in construction.
Notes
1 This development is not being driven by the US. Some 21 percent of the South Korean population are connected. By contrast, only 7 percent of the US population enjoy broadband service, a ranking well below those of Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Lowlands and Canada. 2 I am aware of the complexities of this term and use it here to indicate participation within dominant cultural vernaculars. Historically, this has reflected, like its political counterparts, traditional behaviors, the interests of dominant social classes and the (rearticulated) voice of the majority, all with guarantees for pluralism and minority rights. 3 Clay Shirky's (2003) estimate is based on 100 million of the net's 300 million PCs, each with a 100 Mhz chip and a 100Mb drive. 4 The situation has been well summarized by Henry Jenkins: 'patterns of media consumption have been profoundly altered by a succession of new media technologies which enable average citizens to participate in the archiving, annotation, appropriation, transformation, and re-circulation of media content' (Jenkins, 2003) . Countless subcultures and communities have emerged around these practices, such as fan fiction sites, bloggers, music exchanges, collaborative news networks, and so on.
